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Abstract: 
This paper presents a model to analyze the consequences of competition in order-flow 
between a profit maximizing stock exchange and an alternative trading platform on the 
decisions concerning trading fees and listing requirements. Listing requirements, set by the 
exchange, provide public information on listed firms and contribute to a better liquidity on all 
trading venues. It is sometimes asserted that competition induces the exchange to lower its 
level of listing standards compared to a situation in which it is a monopolist, because the 
trading platform can free-ride on this regulatory activity and compete more aggressively on 
trading fees. The present analysis shows that this is not always true and depends on the 
existence and size of gains related to multi market trading. These gains relax competition on 
trading fees. The higher these gains are, the more the exchange can increase its revenue from 
listing and trading when it raises its listing standards. For large enough gains from multi-
market trading, the exchange is not induced to lower the level of listing standards when a 
competing trading platform appears. As a second result, this analysis also reveals a cross - 
subsidization effect between the listing and the trading activity when listing is not 
competitive. This model yields implications about the fee structures on stock markets, the 
regulation of listings and the social optimality of competition for volume.  
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1.  Introduction 
This paper explores how multi-market trading affects the optimal decision of a profit 
maximizing exchange on listing requirements in connection with trading fees and listing fees. 
Over the last two decades exchanges have increasingly been transformed into demutualised 
and listed firms the decisions of which are based on the principle of profit maximization. 
Many  of  them  have  retained  or  acquired  discretion  on  listing  requirements.  Furthermore, 
alternative trading systems have emerged since the 1970’s in the US but very recently in 
Europe,  and  compete  for  volume  with  “traditional”  stock  markets  without  listing  firms 
themselves.
2  The  changes  in  the  competitive  environment  and  the  objective  of  profit 
maximization are sometimes seen as factors inducing stock market s to reduce their level of 
regulation and to deteriorate thereby the quality of markets. 
In this paper, a model is established to analyze whether competition for order flow 
between a “traditional” stock exchange and an alternative trading platform leads to a lower 
level  of  listing  requirements  compared  to  a  situation  in  which  the  stock  exchange  is  a 
monopoly. The specific questions addressed are the following: Where do the gains and losses 
related to listing requirements come from? Why does a profit maximizing stock exchange 
regulate  listing  at  all?  How  are  the  listing  and  trading  activities  linked?  How  is  the 
equilibrium level of listing requirements related to the strength of competition for order-flow? 
Finally, which welfare effects are related to the existence of an alternative trading platform? 
If an exchange regulates listings, competing trading platforms can free ride on this 
regulatory  activity  while  offering  more  advantageous  trading  conditions.  The  exchange, 
which does not internalize the profit of trading platforms and faces competition on trading 
fees, might be induced to reduce the level of listing requirements when a trading platform 
appears.  The  results  of  the  present  analysis  show  that  this  is  not  necessarily  the  case. 
Competition for order-flow reduces the trading costs borne by investors due either to smaller 
trading fees or to a smaller price impact. This, in turn, induces the listing firm to issue more 
shares on the exchange. Not only does competition alter the distribution of volume, it also 
increases the total volume and contributes to raising the listing fee the exchange can charge. 
These  effects  might  increase  the  marginal  gain  the  exchange  obtains  from  raising  listing 
standards and might lead to a higher equilibrium level of listing requirements than the one that 
obtains  in  a  monopoly  situation.  Such  an  equilibrium  occurs  when  investors  have  strong 
                                                 
2 These alternative trading systems are for instance electronic order books such as Chi-X or Island which offer to 
organise trading in the shares of large firms listed on stock exchanges.   3 
incentives to split their orders across the two trading venues, in which case competition for 
order-flow is weak. This finding is in contrast to what the free-rider logic suggests. 
The model developed in this paper is based on the following assumptions:  The owner 
of a firm with a value unknown to market participants lists the firm on a stock exchange to 
sell a fraction of his shares to outside investors. At a later period, these investors might trade 
and can do so on a stock exchange or on an alternative trading platform. On both venues, they 
trade with a risk averse market maker, which creates a price impact corresponding to the risk 
premium of the market makers. Risk aversion ensures the absorption capacity of both markets 
is limited, which is crucial in the model. At the IPO stage, the investors discount the IPO price 
they are willing to pay by their expected trading costs. The listed firm must commit to listing 
requirements that oblige the firm to disclose noisy information about its productivity after it 
undertook the IPO, and to thereby reduce information asymmetry on the secondary market. 
Complying with listing requirements is costly for the firm. Both trading venues charge a fee 
per traded share and determine this fee simultaneously to maximize their respective profits. In 
addition, the exchange charges a listing fee which is proportional to the surplus net of costs 
that the owner of the firm earns by undertaking the listing. The exchange determines the level 
of listing requirements to maximize its profit.  
Consider first an exchange which is a monopoly, both in listing and in trading. Higher 
listing requirements reduce the trading costs that investors expect to incur. This translates into 
a higher IPO price inducing the owner of the firm to sell more shares, to the extent that the 
gain from smaller trading costs is not offset by the additional compliance costs. In this case, 
his surplus also increases. As a consequence, the exchange benefits from a higher level of 
listing requirements both through a larger income from trading and through a larger income 
from listing. The optimal level of listing requirements is reached when the marginal increase 
in compliance costs offsets these marginal gains. 
In the case in which a trading platform competes for volume with the exchange, both 
the  pressure  this  competition  induces  on  the  trading  fees,  and  the  smaller  price  impact 
investors can obtain due to multi-market trading, increase the IPO price. This leads to a higher 
number of issued shares and thus a higher volume on the secondary market as well as a higher 
surplus for the initial owner of the firm. In this situation, an increase in the level of listing 
requirements has two effects: it reduces the size of the price impact faced by investors on both 
trading venues intensifying thereby competition on trading fees, and it reduces overall trading 
costs leading to a higher number of issued shares and thus to an increase in the total volume 
and in the revenue from listing. When the competition effect on trading fees dominates, the   4 
trading revenue of the exchange decreases the higher the level of listing requirements is and 
its marginal gain from increasing listing standards is smaller than in the monopoly case. The 
level of listing requirements is smaller in equilibrium. If, in contrast, competition on trading 
fees is weak, the marginal revenue that the exchange obtains from raising the listing standards 
is larger than in the monopoly situation even though the exchange loses a fraction of the 
volume. This is due to the possibility to set a higher trading fee and occurs when the price 
impact faced by investors is large (i.e. when the incentive to trade on both venues is strong). 
As  a  consequence  the  exchange  is  induced  to  increase  the  level  of  listing  requirements 
compared to the monopoly situation.  
The  main  contribution  of  this  paper  is  to  show  that  the  effect  of  competition  for 
trading  volume  on  the  regulatory  activity  of  a  self-regulating  exchange  regarding  listings 
depends on whether competition is mainly driven by trading fees or by gains related to the 
fragmentation of order-flow. In the academic literature there is a controversial debate about 
the reasons for order-flow fragmentation and its consequences on market quality.
3 The present 
analysis shows that uncovering the reasons for fragmentation of order flow is essential for the 
assessment of  the consequence of competition in volume on the regulatory activity of a 
“traditional” stock exchange. The existing literature also mainly focuses on the consequences 
of multi-market trading on the behavior of traders and considers stock exchanges as given 
institutions. The present paper pushes the analysis further by considering the impact of multi-
market trading on the decisions of stock markets. 
Listing requirements affect the utility of investors and the profit of additional trading 
venues. If they are determined by the exchange, they are sub-optimal from a social point of 
view  since  the  exchange  bears  a  part  of  the  regulatory  costs  but  internalizes  neither  the 
changes in the utility of investors nor the gains of the trading platform. The problem of non 
internalized benefits related to listing requirements can be solved partially by merging the 
exchange  with  the  trading  platform:  While  the  extent  to  which  regulation  is  sub-optimal 
becomes smaller due to the merger, the merged entity increases the trading fee due to the lack 
of competition. Also, the decision about the level of listing requirements depends again on the 
factors driving order-flow fragmentation.  
As a  second result, this  paper reveals  the existence of  a cross-subsidization effect 
between the listing and the trading activities. Smaller trading fees increase the surplus of the 
owner of the firm and lead thereby to an increase in the listing fee. The equilibrium trading 
                                                 
3 See Pagano (1989b), Gajewski and Gresse (2007), Foucault and Menkveld (2008), O’Hara and Ye (2009), 
Chowdry and Nanda (1991), Madhavan (1995), Foucault and Gehrig (2008)   5 
fee is lower than whithout income from listing. In the case of competition for volume, this 
effect triggers price competition between the trading venues. Consequently, the association of 
listing and trading in one profit maximising entity leads to smaller average trading costs as 
compared to a case in which listing and trading are separated. 
One  way  which  has  been  proposed  to  mitigate  the  supposed  problem  of  under-
regulation  related  to  competition  in  volume  consists  of  separating  listing  from  trading 
completely so that exchanges only provide liquidity but have no discretion on listings (Macey 
and O’Hara 2005). Many other reasons might also justify a separation of these functions.
4 The 
economic objectives of the listing and trading functions can be achieved through different 
organisational  settings,  including  settings,  in  which   they  are  carried  out  by  different 
independent organisations. However, the present analysis shows that bundling the listing and 
trading  functions  on  one  single  exchange  or  separat ing  them  into  several  independent 
organisations has substantial impacts on the price structure of the services provided in relation 
to these functions. 
These findings are of particular interest when considering the recent evolution in the 
stock market industry. The demutualisation process of stock exchanges has brought about 
changes in the competency of some stock exchanges regarding listing conditions. While some 
exchanges have lost discretion on listings, others have kept or even  acquired the right to 
regulate  listings  autonomously.
5  The variety of existing  organisational models shows that 
there  is  no  consensus  among  policy  makers  regarding  self  regulatory  competencies  of 
exchanges.  These developments have triggered a debate in the  professional and the legal 
academic literature about whether stock exchanges should continue to regulate listings.
 6  The 
reasons mentioned in favor or against regulation of listings by stock exchanges are based on 
arguments  developed  in  the  literature  on  self-regulatory  organizations.
7  They  are related, 
among other things, to the incompatibility of listing regulation with the objective of profit 
                                                 
4 Other reasons are related to the existence of conflicts of interests, anti-competitive behaviour, the lack of 
incentives to enforce listing requirements as well as the rise of other institutions which compete with exchanges 
in different services and might be more efficient than exchanges. See Fleckner (2006), Lee (2002), Macey and 
O’Hara (2002, 2005), Macey et al. (2005). 
5 Firms wishing to trade on the London Stock Exchange and the Hong Kong Stock Exchange need first to be 
listed by the respective independent authority, the Financial Services Authority and  the Securities and Futures 
Commission. Euronext has remained self-regulating while Deutsche Börse has acquired the right to determine 
listing rules in 2002. The NYSE has separated the entire regulatory activity from other operations. This activity  
is now carried out by a separate entity. 
6 Fleckner (2006), Macey and O’Hara (2005),  Macey and O’Hara (2002),, Lee (2002), Steil (2002), Centre for 
financial market integrity (2007), OICV – IOSCO Consultation Report (2006)  
7 See for instance DeMarzo et al. (2005)   6 
maximization  or  to  the  necessity  to  sustain  the  confidence  of  investors  specifically  in  a 
competitive environment. 
While the debate about regulatory competencies of stock markets is strong in the legal 
literature, only a small number of studies in economics and finance analyze the economic 
rationales behind choices of self-regulating and profit-maximizing exchanges.  Chemmanur 
and  Fulghieri  (2006)  analyze  how  profit  maximizing  exchanges  set  optimal  listing 
requirements  and  suggest  that  exchanges  are  induced  to  set  a  high  level  of  listing 
requirements  because  this  allows  them  to  build  and  to  sustain  a  good  reputation.  In 
Chemmanur and Fulghieri’s model listing requirements refer to the efficiency with which the 
exchange  selects  the  firms  it  lists.  In  the  present  paper,  in  contrast,  listing  requirements 
constitute a commitment of the firm to reveal information. Also, the authors only consider 
competition  in  listings  and  trading does  not  occur, while the present  study analyses  both 
listing and trading.  
Competition  in  trading  in  relation  with  disclosure  requirements  is  addressed  in 
Huddart  et  al.  (1999).  In  their  model,  managers  who  list  their  firms  also  possess  private 
information which they want to exploit by trading their shares. Liquidity concentrates on the 
exchange  with  the  highest  disclosure  standards  due  to  smaller  adverse  selection  costs. 
Managers prefer to list their firms on this exchange although they cannot exploit their private 
information. This induces exchanges competing for listings and for trading volume to set high 
levels  of listing  requirements  and to  “race to  the top”.  The present  paper displays  major 
differences compared to Huddart et al. (1999). While in Huddart et al. liquidity concentrates 
on one exchange, the present paper allows for endogenous fragmentation of volume. Also, 
exchanges in Huddart et al. maximize only volume. In the present paper, the exchange obtains 
revenue from both, listing and trading, and the alternative trading platform has revenue only 
from trading. Therefore, the model presented in this paper is more realistic in that it considers 
the decisions of trading venues also on listing and trading fees and not only on volume. 
This paper also relates to literature dealing with the price structure on stock markets. 
The linkage between listing and trading fees is studied in Foucault and Parlour (2004). The 
authors show that where firms differ in productivity, highly productive firms prefer to list on 
an exchange with a high listing fee and a small trading fee while firms with a low productivity 
have the reverse preference. This is because highly productive firms issue a higher number of 
shares. They need to attract investors with a shorter expected horizon, and are therefore more 
sensitive  to  the  level  of  trading  costs.  In  Foucault  and  Parlour  (2004),  two  competing 
exchanges differentiate in trading and in listing fees and the equilibrium structure of these   7 
fees depends on the profile of the firms which the exchanges attract as clientele: An exchange 
listing firms with a high productivity will set a high listing fee and a small trading fee in 
equilibrium. While competition for volume affects the price structure, the authors consider in 
particular the listing decisions of firms and assume that the shares are traded on the exchange 
on which the firms are listed. In addition, the authors do not analyze listing requirements. 
The article proceeds as follows. Section 2 sets out the model. Section 3 analyses the 
trading round and the IPO stage. Section 4 analyses of the decisions of a monopoly exchange 
on the trading fee and the level of listing requirements as a benchmark case. Section 5 carries 
out the analysis of competition for volume. Section 6 extends the analysis by considering the 
social  desirability  of  competition  in  volume,  the  social  optimality  of  listing  requirements 
when  they  are  privately  determined  by  a  stock  market  and  the  influence  of  differently 
informed investor bases on the main result. Section 7 presents the implications of the analysis 
developed  in  the  previous  sections  and  formulates  conclusions.  Proofs  are  given  in  the 
appendix. 
 
2.  Model 
The game is organized in six stages. Time is not discounted. There is a firm initially 
entirely owned by a private financier (a venture capitalist for example) who is called “the 
owner” in what follows. The owner sells a fraction of his shares to two large outside investors 
by listing the firm on a stock exchange. At a later period, these investors can be hit by a 
liquidity shock or observe private information about the firm. They can trade their shares on 
the  stock  exchange  or  on  an  alternative  trading  platform.  Trading  is  intermediated  by 
competitive  market  makers.  All  agents  are  risk  neutral  except  the  owner  and  the  market 
makers who are risk averse. 
The timing of the model is illustrated in figure 1. In the two first stages, the exchange 
determines its listing and trading conditions. First, it sets a level of listing requirements. This 
decision is considered as a long term decision since it implies the setting up of particular 
listing  procedures  as  well  as  of  specialized  departments  to  enforce  these  requirements.
8 
Second, the exchange sets the trading fee. This decision is considered as short term decisions 
since fees can be changed quickly.
9 At the third stage, the owner of the firm determines how 
                                                 
8  Listing  requirements  can  also  contribute  to  the  reputation  of  the  exchange  (Chemmanur  and  Fulghieri 
(2006))and are therefore taken in a long term perspective. 
9  Foucault and Parlour (2004) analyze the d ecisions of exchanges on listing fees and trading technologies 
sequentially. Competition in listing fees represents short run competition and occurs in the second stage of their 
model while competition in trading technologies represents long run competition and occurs at the first stage.   8 
many shares to sell to the outside investors. At this stage, the future cash flows of the firm are 
unknown to all agents. At the fourth stage, the firm learns the value of future cash flows. To 
comply with listing requirements the firm releases a noisy signal about its value. At the fifth 
date, one of both investors might be hit by a liquidity shock and might sell his entire holding. 
The other investor might observe perfectly the value of the future cash flows of the firm and 
might trade to exploit this information. Finally payoffs are realized. The equilibrium concept 
is sub-game perfection. The model is solved by backward induction.  
 
Figure 1: extensive form of the game 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.1.  The firm 
We consider a firm with assets in place. Initially, the firm is completely owned by a 
private financier or an entrepreneur who has invested an amount  K  in the firm at an earlier 
stage not analyzed explicitly in this model. We assume that the owner holds  K shares which 
he has bought for 1 monetary unit each.
10 This normalization allows reasoning in number of 
shares, which reduces considerably the complexity of the analysis. The firm realizes a project 
which yields a payoff of  x V  1  per monetary unit invested by the owner, and thus per 
share,  wherex  is  a  random  variable taking  two  equally  likely  values:  h x   and l x   with 
0   l h x x . Shares are divisible so that fractions of a share can be traded. 
The owner of the firm is characterized by a mean variance utility, U . At  3  t he lists 
the firm on the exchange and sells a fraction,    1 , 0   , of his shares to outside investors at the 
share price,  IPO P .
11 He determines the fraction of shares to be sold to maximize his utility:  
 
                                                 
10 A similar normalization is used in Foucault and Parlour (2004), where investors can buy shares for 1 monetary 
unit. 
11 Here, the possibility to diversify risk is the reason why the owner lists his firm and sells shares. However, the 
entire analysis would also hold in a setting in which the firm sells shares to realize a new project and determines 
the number of shares sold to maximize its proceeds from the IPO. 
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where   measures  his  risk  aversion,    V E is  the  expected  payoff  per  share  and 
2 2 ) ( 25 . 0 l h V x x     is the variance of the value. The utility of the owner if he does not sell 
shares is: 
 
2 2
2
V K V KE U 

                (2) 
The surplus he obtains when he lists the firm and sells a fraction   of his shares, is: 
 
U U U    ) ( ) (                 (3) 
 
At the time of listing,  xis unknown to all agents. Therefore, the listing decision alone 
does not convey information about the quality of the firm to the market.
12 The firm learns the 
value of the project after the shares are floated but before trading takes place. However, it 
cannot  credibly  convey  this  information  to   market  participants.  It  remains  its  private 
information. This hypothesis is necessary, because the   model  relies on the exis tence of 
information asymmetry. 
 
2.2.   The stock market industry 
We assume that there is a stock market listing the firm and organizing trading in the 
shares. It is a monopolist in listing. There is also a trading platform which does not operate 
listings but offers only to trade the shares of the firm listed on the exchange. In what follows, 
the stock market operating listings is called “the exchange” whereas the market operating only 
trading  in  the  listed  shares  is  called  “the  trading  platform”.  All  variables  related  to  the 
exchange have a subscripte, and those related to the trading platform have a subscript pl. 
The exchange sets listing requirements, which are a set of rules to which the listed 
firm must adhere. These rules contain accounting and reporting standards but also corporate 
governance mechanisms which, if in place, reveal information about the value of the firm. 
Listing requirements lead to a noisy public signal, s, about the value of the firm, which is 
                                                 
12 In a different set up in which the firm knows its type before it takes the decision to list, Stoughton et al. (2001) 
show the existence of separating equilibria in which only good firms list and reveal perfectly their type. The 
results  in  this  paper  rely  on  the  existence  of  information  asymmetry  and  would  also  hold  if  listing  were 
informative as long as the type of the firm is not revealed perfectly. Similarly, a noisy signal at the IPO about the 
type of the firm would not change the results.   10 
observed by all market participants. The observed signal corresponds to the true value with 
probability   1 , 5 . 0   ;  it  corresponds  to  the  wrong value  otherwise.  The  precision  of  the 
signal,   , represents the strictness of listing requirements: the more stringent they are, the 
higher is the probability to observe the true value of the firm. The signal is expected to take 
either value,  h x  or  l x , with a probability of ½. The listed firm bears compliance costs when it 
releases the required information:  ) ( C  with  0 ' C  and  0 ' '  C . 
Both trading venues charge a trading fee per share traded on the secondary market,  e f  
and  pl f .
13 The exchange also charges a listing fee, F, paid by the owner of the firm when he 
lists the firm. We assume that  the listing fee is the outcome of some exogenous bargaining 
between the owner of the firm and the exchange. It is a fraction,   1 , 0   , of the owner’s 
surplus net of compliance costs.
14 Since the owner holds  ) 1 (   of the shares, he anticipates 
that his final total payoff is reduced by the same fraction of compliance costs. The listing fee 
is: 
 
  ) ( ) 1 ( ) (     C U F                (4) 
 
This assumption is important for what follows, it is hinged upon the assumption that listing is 
not competitive. Some observations might justify this. First, competition for listings on an 
international level seems to be limited to a small number of firms.  Also, these firms prefer to 
cross-list rather than to do an IPO directly on a foreign exchange.
15 Second, on a regional or 
national level, exchanges competing for listings are rare when we look outside the US.
16 From 
a practical point of view, some exchanges discriminate through prices with a listing fee 
schedule depending for instance on the market value  or on the number of shares of firms. 
Other exchanges impose fixed listing fees, independent of the size of firms .
 17 The results of 
                                                 
13 The structure of trading fees differs among stock exchanges. Many charge fees that are proportional to the 
value traded. However, some also charge fees per order or per share. The assumption made here, that trading 
fees are proportional to the number of traded shares and not to the transaction value keeps the analysis tractable.  
14 If the firm had no bargaining power, the exchange would charge the entire surplus of the owner.  
15Some Israeli high-tech firms listed directly in the US instead of on their home market (Blass & Yafeh (2001)). 
This however, constitutes an exception. See Karolyi (2006) for an overview of the literature on cross-listings.  
16 As an example, there are only two German firms cross-listed on the European regulated markets operated by 
the group NYSE Euronext and two French firms cross-listed on the regulated market of Deutsche Börse. 
17 The NYSE, for instance, charges a listing fee which is  proportional to the number of issued shares (see the 
Listed Company Manual, www.nyse.com). Deutsche Börse imposes a fixed annual fee which is independent of 
the size of listed firms or of the number of shares issued (see http://deutsche-boerse.com).   11 
this model hold with different fee structures, as long as the revenue that the exchange obtains 
from listing depends on the listing or share issue decisions of the firm. 
The  level  of  listing  requirements, ,  and  the  trading  fees  are  determined  by  the 
exchange and by the trading platform to maximize their respective expected profit. As stock 
markets are increasingly transformed into demutualised and listed entities, the objective of 
profit maximization seems relevant. 
 
2.3.  Investors 
Two large investors participate in the IPO of the firm. Each of them buys half of the 
offered  shares.  At  5  t ,  one  of  both  investors  suffers  a  liquidity  shock  (henceforth  the 
“liquidity trader”). With probability ½ this investor must sell his entire holding at this stage. 
Otherwise he does not trade.
18 At the same time, the other investor observes the true value of 
the firm with probability 1 and trades to exploit this information (henceforth the “informed 
trader”). At the IPO (in  3  t ), the investors do not know their type. They expect to become a 
liquidity trader with probability . 
Both investors can trade on the exchange and on the trading platform. On both trading 
venues, they trade with a competitive market maker characterized by a mean-variance utility. 
Market makers do not pay trading fees. This assumption is consistent with the current policy 
of many trading venues to impose reduced trading fees, or not to impose trading fees on 
liquidity suppliers.
19 The market makers determine the bid price they are willing to pay for a 
given number of shares according to the public signal and to the total order-flow they observe. 
They equalize the transaction price to the utility they obtain from trading in the shares of the 
firm. The bid price for a total order -flowQ,  ) (Q P B , and given signal, s, is determined as 
follows: 
 
    Q s V QVar Q s V E Q P B ,
2
, ) (

  ,           (5) 
 
where    measures the risk aversion of the market maker,    Q s V E ,  and    Q s V Var , are the 
expected value of a share and the variance of the value respectively, both conditional on the 
                                                 
18 This assumption that the liquidity trader does not trade with probability ½  is made for simplicity. The model 
also holds if the liquidity trader sold a different number of shares. 
19 If market makers paid trading fees, they would pass it through to the transa ction price and these fees would 
eventually be borne by investors. The results of the analysis would not change qualitatively in such a case.   12 
public signal and on the observed total order-flow. If the market makers buy shares, the bid 
price at which investors can sell these shares decreases with the number of traded shares, 
unless the market makers can infer the true value of the firm from the order-flow or the signal. 
The risk aversion of market makers represents the limited absorption capacity on both trading 
venues  (on  the  secondary  market  of  the  exchange  and  on  the  trading  platform)  which  is 
crucial for the model.
20 
The possible price impact might induce investors to split their orders across the two 
trading venues. Investors execute a fraction  of their order on the trading platform. They 
determine    to maximise the proceeds they obtain from trading. The public signal released 
by the firm is observed on both trading venues. As a consequence, the price obtained by 
investors on the trading venues differs only in the price impact if the submitted orders are of a 
different  size.  The  trading  venues  only  differ  in  trading  fees.  Orders  are  submitted  to 
minimize the costs stemming from the expected price impact and from the trading fees. For a 
quantity Q sold by investors, the objective function is: 
 
  ) ) 1 ( (
2
) 1 (
2 2  

  
      s V QVar f f Min e pl        (6) 
 
where   represents the probability that the market maker does not infer the true value of the 
firm given signal s,  and   
2 ) )( 1 ( l h x x s V Var      is  the variance of the  value  given the 
public signal. 
 
3.   Trading and IPO 
Trading price. This sub-section examines how the price is set in  5  t .  The precision 
of the public signal released by the firm prior to the trading round indicates not only the 
possible value of the asset, but also the probability with which the informed trader has the 
same information as the one observed by the other market participants. If the market maker 
has observed a good signal ( h x ), he knows that the signal is correct with probability . Thus, 
with probability   the informed trader also knows that the firm has a high value. If the market 
                                                 
20 Assuming risk averse market makers is a simple way of modelling the fact that large orders cannot be traded 
without a price impact. However, the results presented in this paper should also hold in a setting in which the 
price impact is generated through another mechanism. Thus, it is not the risk aversion of market makers per se, 
but its consequence on prices which is important here.   13 
maker has observed a bad signal ( l x ), he knows that it is correct with probability . Thus, 
with probability   the informed trader also knows that the firm has a low value. 
The informed trader always imitates the liquidity trader and sells his entire holding, 
K  5 . 0 , if he trades. He also splits his order across the two trading venues in the same way as 
the  liquidity  trader  to  remain  hidden.  If  the  informed  trader  submits  orders  of  different 
quantities  to  the  market  makers,  he  is  recognized  and  cannot  benefit  from  his  private 
information. The market makers on both trading venues face a signal extraction problem. 
Consider the market maker on the exchange (the logic is identical for the market maker on the 
trading  platform).  A  total  net  order  flow  of  K   5 . 0 ) 1 (     is  obtained  if  the  informed 
investor knows that the firm has a high value. In this case, the order-flow stems from the 
liquidity trader. The same net order-flow is obtained when the liquidity trader does not trade 
and the strategic trader knows that the firm has a low value. Since the market maker cannot 
infer the quality of the firm from the order flow in these situations, he bears a risk from 
holding the shares. He sets the price equal to the expected value per share minus his risk 
premium per share conditional on the public signal: 
 
  s V KVar s V E P B * 5 . 0 ) 1 (
2
) (  

           (7) 
 
If the firm has a low value and the liquidity trader trades, the market maker observes a net 
order flow of  K
* ) 1 (      and infers from this observation that the firm is bad. If the firm 
has a high value and the liquidity trader does not trade, there is no trading volume. 
The  price, at  which  the  liquidity  trader  expects  to  sell  his  shares  in  the case  of  a 
liquidity shock, is below the expected value of the asset, since the market maker bears a risk 
premium when information remains asymmetric, and he takes into account the possibility of 
informed trading. The expectation of the bid price on the exchange over the signal and the 
probability  of  informed  trading  is  the  expected  value  of  the  shares  reduced  by  a  spread 
composed  of  a  information  component,  S,  and  the  risk  premium  of  the  market  maker, 
e Q RP : 
 
  e B Q RP S V E P E    
2
1
) (           (8) 
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where  ) ( ) 1 ( l h x x S      ,    s V Var RP
2

  and  K Qe   5 . 0 ) 1 (   . See appendix A1 for the 
derivation of equation 8. The expected bid price on the trading platform is similar and differs 
only in the price impact related to the risk aversion of the market maker which is determined 
by  K Qpl
* 5 . 0    .  The expected value of the asset is discounted by the adverse selection 
costs, S, borne by the liquidity investor which accounts for the presence of the informed trader 
on the market. A more volatile asset leads to a less accurate price on average. A more precise 
signal reduces the information gap between the market maker and the informed trader, which 
reduces the adverse selection cost. The signal precision also determines the uncertainty about 
the  value  of  the  asset  and thus  the  risk  premium  of  the  market  maker.  More  precise 
information reduces the conditional variance of the payoff and thereby the risk premium and 
the price impact. It follows that a higher level of listing requirements improves the liquidity 
by reducing the adverse selection costs and the price impact borne by the liquidity trader. 
When  1   , uncertainty about the firm is completely removed and investors expect to 
sell  their  shares  at  the  true  value.  The  spread  is  zero.  If  5 . 0   ,  the  public  signal  is 
completely uninformative. The spread is at its highest value. 
 
Fragmentation. When  0   and  1   , investors expect to bear a price impact due to 
the limited absorption capacity of the trading venues. This might induce them to split their 
orders across the two trading venues. If the order-flow is fragmented, each market maker buys 
a smaller amount of shares and the total price impact faced by investors is smaller compared 
to  the  situation  in  which  the  entire  flow  is  directed  to  only  one  trading  venue.
21    When 
investors split their order  between the exchange and the trading platform, they trade -off the 
gain in the price impact against a possibly higher cost due to different trading fees. For given 
trading fees and a given total quantity of shares sold by investors, Q, the optimal fraction of 
volume executed on the trading platform is: 
 
 
Q RP
f f pl e

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2 2
1 *                  (9) 
                                                 
21 The possibility to reduce  the price impact by splitting orders across several  market  makers (or  markets) 
grounds also the models in Bernhardt and Hughson (1997) and Chowdry and Nanda (1991). However, utility 
gains from the possibility to trade on several venues can also stem from the possibility to avoid queuing in an 
order  book  and  to  increase  the  execution  probability  of  a  limit  order  (Foucault  and  Menkveld  (2008)). 
Theoretical and empirical research displays mixed results concerning  the existence of such gains. However, 
recent empirical work (O-Hara and Ye (2009), Foucault and Menkveld (2008)) find evidence consistent with the 
existence of liquidity gains associated to fragmentation.   15 
 
If the trading fees are identical on both trading venues, investors execute half of their order on 
each trading venue. If trading fees differ, investors execute the larger part of their order on the 
cheaper trading venue. The higher the risk aversion of the market makers,   ,  the larger the 
gain investors obtain from splitting their orders. Therefore, a higher    makes investors less 
sensitive to the difference in trading fees and to changes in trading fees. If there is no price 
impact,  0   , there is no reason for investors to split their order. They trade on the trading 
venue with the lowest trading fee. Similarly, a high precision of public information reduces 
the price impact on both the exchange and the platform, and reduces the incentive of investors 
to split their order-flow. When information is perfectly revealed ( 1   ), they also trade only 
on the cheapest venue. 
The risk aversion parameter   determines the strength of competition between the two 
trading  venues.  The  smaller     is,  the  tougher  is  competition  in  trading  fees  since  the 
distribution  of  the  volume  across  both  trading  venues  is  more  sensitive  to  differences  in 
trading fees. Investors gain less from splitting their orders. In contrast, a large    stands for 
weak competition in trading fees because the incentive of investors to split their order is 
strong. This parameter can be compared to the transportation cost in the Hotelling (1929) 
model in that it determines the degree of price competition between the two trading venues.  
 
IPO. At the IPO stage, both investors anticipate that they might be either a liquidity 
trader or an informed trader in the future. Both investors face the price impact related to the 
risk aversion of market makers. They also anticipate that the liquidity trader trades at a loss 
against the other investor who is the informed trader. At this stage we make the assumption 
that becoming the informed trader or the liquidity trader is equally likely:  5 . 0   . The impact 
of informed trading on the main result will be developed at the end of the analysis. Regardless 
of whether investors trade, they anticipate to bear a fraction of the compliance costs and take 
this cost into account in the price they are willing to pay for the shares 
In the case investors become the liquidity trader, they expect to keep their holding 
until the end of the game with probability ½. Their expected wealth per share is: 
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where    ) ) 1 ( (
2
2 * 2 *  

   s V Var RP   is  the  weighted  marginal  risk  premium  of  market 
makers  and  e pl f f f ) 1 (
* *       is the weighted trading fee. In the case investors become 
the informed trader, they expect to trade with probability 2 1 . Their expected wealth per share 
is: 
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The owner of the firm sells the shares at the highest price he can obtain from the 
investors,  i.e.  the  price  which  makes  them  indifferent  between  buying  and  not  buying. 
Therefore, the IPO price corresponds to the expected per share wealth of investors before they 
know their type: 
 
K
C
f K RP V E PIPO
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2
1
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The IPO price increases when investors bear smaller trading costs. Since the probability to be 
a  liquidity  trader  is  ½,  the  expected  adverse  selection  cost  is  offset  by  the  expected 
information gain and does not affect the IPO price. If the probability to become the liquidity 
trader was large,  5 . 0   , the adverse selection cost would reduce the IPO price and vice 
versa if  5 . 0   . The results derived in the analysis which follows hold for any probability . 
The impact of different value for this probability is explained in an extension.  
  The possibility to sell shares on the exchange allows the owner of the exchange to 
receive a payment which is certain and therefore to reduce his risk. However, the cost of 
selling shares consists in selling them below their expected value due to the trading costs 
borne by investors. Also, investors pass the compliance costs through to the owner. Thus, it is 
the owner of the firm who bears the full burden of the compliance with listing requirements. 
Replacing the expression of the IPO price (equation 12) in the objective of the owner 
(equation 1), yields the optimal fraction of shares the owner is willing to sell on the exchange: 
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The fraction, 
*  , is always smaller than 1. The owner never sells his entire holding. We 
assume that K is large enough for 
*  to be greater than zero. The owner sells more shares the 
smaller the trading costs of investors are since higher trading costs reduce the IPO price and 
therefore  the  proceeds  from  the  sale.  In  particular  an  increase  in  the  level  of  listing 
requirements reduces the price impact since the uncertainty about the final payoff becomes 
smaller, and leads to a higher 
*  . 
The fraction of shares sold by the owner depends on the unweighted average of the 
trading fees and on the price impact. It is independent of the actual distribution of the volume 
across  the  two  trading  venues  determined  by
*  .  Thus,  the  number  of  issued  shares  is 
determined as if investors traded half of their shares on each market. This is because the gain 
obtained by investors due to the possibility to strategically allocate their order-flow across the 
two trading venues (compared to a situation in which they trade half of their order on each 
venue) leads to a utility increase for the owner which is independent of the quantity of traded 
shares,  RP f f e pl 4 ) (
2  .  
The surplus of the owner is obtained by combining equation 13 with the IPO price and 
his utility: 
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The surplus of the owner increases the smaller the trading costs of investors are because he 
sells more shares at a higher price. It increases also with a higher gain from the optimal 
volume allocation across the trading venues, represented by the second term in equation 14, 
because this gain increases furthermore the IPO price.  Both elements of the owner’s surplus 
increase with the level of listing requirements. 
The initial owner lists his firm if and only if his surplus exceeds the compliance costs: 
) ( ) 1 ( ) (
* *    C U    . Otherwise, the utility gain he obtains from diversification is not large 
enough to compensate the compliance costs related to the listing.
22 
                                                 
22 The fact that costs related with the compliance of listing standards, in particular those concerning information 
disclosure and corporate governance, might exceed the benefits of a listing on a highly regulated exchange for 
some firms is debated in the literature on cross listings and in particular on the competitiveness of the NYSE. 
Anecdotal evidence also indicates the deterring role these costs can have for firms seeking to list.   18 
Although producing public information at a later period about the value of the firm 
increases the surplus that the owner of the firm obtains at the IPO, he cannot credibly commit 
to produce this information when he keeps the control over the firm. Information is produced 
in stage 4, after the IPO, date at which the initial owner of the firm does not intervene on the 
market. At that stage, he does not benefit from revealing information but bears the cost. Thus, 
as long as he keeps the control over the firm ( 5 . 0
*   ) he will not release an informative 
signal ex post. This is in particular the case, when the risk aversion of the owner is small 
enough. The present analysis does not deal with voluntary information disclosure which is left 
for  future  research.  It  is  assumed  throughout  the  analysis  that the  firm  does  not  disclose 
information voluntarily.
23 
 
4.  Listing and trading: the monopoly case 
The analysis of the decisions on the trading fee and on the level of listing requirements 
is first carried out by considering a situation in which the exchange is a monopolist both in 
listing and in trading. In this case,  0    by assumption. This allows a better understanding of 
the determinants of the optimal level of listing requirements as well as of the determinants of 
the trading fee. The next section includes the competing trading platform in the analysis.  
The volume expected to occur in  5  t is: 
 
K
* * 5 . 0                  (15) 
 
where 
* *  is the fraction of shares sold by the owner in the case the exchange is a monopoly 
in trading.
24 The exchange knows that one among the two investors will become the liquidity 
trader and the other the speculative trader. T herefore, the probability with which investors 
expect to become the liquidity trader in  3  t , does not affect the volume that occurs once the 
type of investors has been realized. The liquidity trader trades with probability ½  and the 
speculative trader trades if he has observed that the firm has a low value which occurs with 
probability ½. Both investors sell their entire holding if they trade,  K
* * 5 . 0  . 
                                                 
23 The firm might not release information at stage 4 for other reasons: There might be an interest conflict 
between informed and uninformed shareholders (if these have the control) or a moral hazard problem between 
the shareholders and the manager of the firm. 
24 
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The exchange determines its trading fee,  m e f , , to maximize its expected profit,  m e,  . 
The profit is composed of the listing fee,  F , and the total volume multiplied by the trading 
fee. The objective function of the exchange is: 
 
  K f C U Max m e f m e
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The  exchange  determines  the trading  fee  so  as to  maximize  its income  from  trading  and 
listing. The surplus of the owner contains the part of the compliance costs borne by investors. 
This cost has no influence on the trading fee determined by the exchange. At a given level of 
compliance costs, it corresponds to a fixed cost for the firm and thus for the exchange. 
The trading fee has  opposite effects  on the exchange’s profit:  On the one hand  it 
increases the income per traded share. However on the other hand, not only does it reduce the 
number of shares sold by the owner of the firm and therefore the trading volume, it also 
reduces  the  surplus  and  thereby  the  revenue  from  listings.  The  exchange  determines  the 
trading fee taking into account its negative effect on the volume as well as on the listing fee. 
 
Proposition 1 
The optimal trading fee is:   
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The equilibrium trading fee depends on the size of the volume and on its impact on the listing 
fee. The more the initial owner gains from selling shares (the higher his risk aversion is or the 
more risky the asset is), the higher is the volume on the exchange. This leads to a higher 
equilibrium  trading  fee.  The  equilibrium  fee  does  not  depend  on  the  level  of  listing 
requirements. This is not only because informed trading does not affect the IPO price and thus 
the size of the IPO issue. This comes also from the fact that the marginal gain in the revenue 
from trading as well as the marginal loss due to a smaller amount of issued shares when the 
trading  fee  increases  are  both  scaled  by  the  price  impact.  A  higher  level  of  listing 
requirements reduces the price impact and contributes thereby to an increase in the marginal 
gain and in the marginal loss from a higher trading fee. For an equal quantity of shares, the 
exchange obtains a higher benefit per share, but the reduction in the number of issued shares 
is also larger. Both effects cancel out.  
The exchange takes into account the negative effect of the trading fee on its listing fee, 
it therefore sets a trading fee that is smaller than the fee maximizing the revenue from volume.   20 
In  equation  19,  the  expression 
2 2 V K   represents  the  optimal  trading  fee  if  there  is  no 
revenue  from  listing.  This  expression  is  reduced  by  the  term  ) 2 ( 2
2     V K which 
represents the negative effect of a higher trading fee on the profit of the exchange through the 
reduced listing fee. 
Because  of  this  interdependence  between  listing  and  trading  fees,  investors pay  a 
lower trading fee and are better off (for a given level of listing requirements) if the exchange 
exercises both functions, listing and trading, than if the exchange only organizes trading. As a 
consequence, the volume on the exchange and the surplus of the owner are larger when both 
functions are exercised by the same institution, the exchange, than when these functions are 
disconnected and fulfilled by two independent institutions.  
In  the  present  case,  the  optimal  trading  fee is  always  positive. This  is  due  to  the 
assumption that the probability with which one investor observes private information is 1 and 
that the probability of becoming a liquidity trader is ½. If these assumptions are relaxed, the 
equilibrium trading fee  could also be negative for some parameter regions. Extending the 
model in such a way allows for situations in which the exchange pays for order-flow because 
it has income from listing. 
The owner of the firm undertakes the IPO if and only if its utility gain net of all costs 
is greater than zero: 
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The  exchange  sets  the  equilibrium  level  of  listing  requirements  such  as  to  equalize  its 
marginal gains that stem from a higher number of issued shares and a higher utility gain of the 
owner of the firm, to the marginal losses stemming from the increased compliance costs that 
reduce the revenue from listing. However, there is an upper bound to the level of listing 
requirements given by the participation constraint of the firm (equation 18). The exchange 
never sets the level of listing standards above the level rendering the participation constraint 
of the owner binding.  
 
5.  Competition for volume. 
The existence of the alternative trading platform allows investors to benefit from a 
smaller total price impact because they can trade on both venues (or equivalently with two   21 
market makers) rather than on a single one. This reduces the trading costs and thus the cost 
borne by the owner of the firm when he lists his firm and sells shares. The number of issued 
shares  and  consequently  the  overall  trading  volume  are  higher  in  the  case  in  which  the 
alternative platform exists. This also leads to a higher surplus earned by the owner and thus to 
a higher income from listing for the exchange. 
The  smaller  price  impact  faced  by  investors  also  increases  the  sensitivity  of  the 
volume and of the owner’s surplus to changes in trading fees. Since the owner of the firm 
issues more shares due to the smaller price impact, the effect of higher trading fees per traded 
share affects his utility to a larger extend. When trading fees increase, he will reduce the 
number of shares he issues to a larger extend than in the monopoly case. 
When the exchange and the trading platform determine their trading fees, they take 
into account how changes in trading fees affect their income per shares as well as their market 
share on trading volume. As in the benchmark case, trading fees affect the volume and the 
surplus of the owner. However, trade-offs are finer than previously because the two trading 
venues depend on each other: a change in the trading fee on one trading venue alters the 
volume and the revenue of the other trading venue.  If, for instance, the trading platform 
lowers its trading fee, the overall number of shares in the economy becomes larger. The 
platform benefits not only from a higher fraction of the volume, but this fraction concerns an 
overall  larger  number  of  shares.  In  this  case,  the  exchange  has  a  smaller  fraction  of  the 
volume but the general increase in the number of shares limits the loss of revenue incurred by 
the exchange in its trading activity. Furthermore, the exchange benefits from a higher listing 
fee since the surplus of the initial owner of the firm is larger. 
While in the monopoly case, the trading fee was only determined by its impact on the 
total volume, trading fees in the case of competition depend also on the degree of competition 
for  trading  volume  between  the  trading  venues.  Strong  competition  for  trading  volume 
corresponds  to  a  situation  in  which  the  market  shares  of  the  trading  venues  are  highly 
sensitive to changes in trading fees (see equation 9). 
  The  expected  overall  volume  is  determined  as  in  section  2  (equation  15).  The 
exchange and the platform set  the trading fee simultaneously to  maximize their expected 
profits: 
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While  the  adjustment  of  trading  fees  affects  only  the  distribution  and  size  of  the 
volume from the platform’s point of view, it also affects the listing fee of the exchange. The 
equilibrium trading fee set by the exchange differs from the fee set by the platform because 
the exchange takes into account the negative effect of the average trading fee on its income 
from listing. 
 
Proposition 2 
(i)  If  0   , the exchange always sets a smaller trading fee than the trading platform in 
equilibrium: 
* *
pl e f f  . 
(ii)  If  0   ,  0
* *   pl e f f  and investors are indifferent between trading on the exchange 
and trading on the trading platform. 
(iii)  For  0    , the average trading fee is smaller than the trading fee in the monopoly 
case. For  0    , the average trading fee is higher. 
The determination of the threshold  0   is explained in the appendix. 
In  the  case,  in  which  fragmentation  does  not  lead  to  gains  for  investors,  e.g. 
when 0   , they trade on the trading venue with the lowest trading fee. There is no other 
reason for investors to split their order. This leads to price competition à la Bertrand and 
eventually to zero trading fees on both trading venues. 
If 0   ,  the exchange  and  the  platform  capture  a  fraction  of  the  order  flow  since 
investors prefer to split their orders between the two trading venues rather than to execute 
their order on only one trading venue. This relaxes price competition and leads to positive 
trading fees. The income which the exchange earns from listing, increases the smaller the 
average trading fee is, since this leads to a higher surplus of the owner. Thus, the exchange 
has an incentive to trigger price competition by setting a smaller trading fee than the trading 
platform. Here again, the existence of a income from listing makes investors and thus the 
owner better off (everything else equal) since it leads to overall lower trading fees than when 
this income did not exist. 
When the gain from fragmentation is small, investors are sensitive to differences in 
trading fees. In this case, both trading venues are induced to set a small trading fee. The 
exchange  as  well  as  the  platform  increase  their  trading  fees  when  the  gain  related  to 
fragmentation becomes large (when    becomes large). In this case, a large difference in 
trading fees has a minor impact on the distribution of the trading volume. The average trading 
fee faced by investors can even exceed the equilibrium trading fee set by a monopolist. This is 
because the trading platform is induced to increase its own trading fee above the monopoly   23 
level when the trading volume is not sensitive to the difference of trading fees. It increases 
thereby its revenue from trading without losing much trading volume.  
 
Lemma 1 
For a given level of listing requirements: 
(i)  The overall volume is larger than in the monopoly case 
(ii)  The  utility  gain  that  the  owner  obtains  from  the  IPO  is  larger  than  in  the 
monopoly case 
(iii)  The exchange obtains a higher profit if and only if  1    . Otherwise, its profit 
is smaller. 
 
The possibility of multi-market trading increases the utility gain of the owner and the 
number of shares he sells in equilibrium because he obtains two gains from this possibility: 
either the average trading fee is larger but the owner benefits from the increased absorption 
capacity of the markets which is reflected in the smaller total price impact, or the markets are 
anyway able to absorb large volumes but the induced competition leads to smaller trading 
fees. In any case, the total trading costs of investors are lower than in the monopoly situation. 
While the total volume is larger with fragmentation, the part of the volume captured by the 
exchange is smaller than in the monopoly case. Despite the loss of volume, the exchange can 
obtain a higher profit in the presence of an alternative platform when competition on trading 
fees is weak enough to compensate the loss in revenue due to a smaller trading volume. The 
higher income from listing is not sufficient for the exchange to obtain a larger profit; it must 
be complemented by a high enough revenue from trading. 
This discussion shows that there might be conflicting interests regarding competition 
for trading volume between the firm and the exchange. While the owner of the firm always 
benefits  from  competition  (at  a  given  level  of  listing  requirements),  the  exchange  only 
benefits from it when the pressure on trading fees is low enough. 
Not only does competition for volume change the level of listing fees, the surplus from 
the IPO and the profit of the exchange, it also affects the sensitivity of these variables to 
changes in the level of listing requirements.   
 
Lemma 2 
(i)  Equilibrium trading fees diminish with the level of listing requirements. 
(ii)  The larger the gain from fragmentation is (the larger   is), the less equilibrium 
trading fees are sensitive to changes in the level of listing requirements.  
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  In contrast to the monopoly case, the trading fee set by the exchange is sensitive to 
changes in the level of listing requirements. A more informative signal has two opposite 
effects. First, it reduces the price impact on both trading venues and thereby the gain that 
investors obtain from fragmentation. This lowers their incentive to split their orders across the 
two trading venues and enhances the pressure on trading fees, which leads to smaller trading 
fees in equilibrium. Second, a higher level of listing requirements increases the gain per share 
the exchange obtains from increasing its trading fee but enhances also the marginal loss due to 
a smaller trading volume. Not only do the lower trading costs induce the owner of the firm to 
issue more shares, they also render the market share of the exchange more sensitive to the 
difference in the trading fee. 
If the gain of investors coming from multi-market trading is small (if    is small), the 
competition effect dominates the volume effect and leads to a sharp decrease in equilibrium 
trading fees when the level of listing requirements increases. If, in contrast, the gain from 
fragmentation is large (if   is large), the volume effect gains in importance and nearly offsets 
the competition effect, which is then weaker. The equilibrium trading fees become nearly 
insensitive to changes in the precision of public information. 
 
Lemma 3 
The total trading volume and the income from listing increase more with the level of listing 
requirements when an alternative trading platform exists, compared to a situation in which the 
exchange is a monopolist in trading. 
 
The  total  trading  volume  becomes  more  sensitive  to  changes  in  the  level  of  listing 
requirements because it reacts more to changes in trading costs as compared to the monopoly 
case. This amplifies in particular the positive effect of a reduction in the trading fee on the 
trading volume when public information becomes more precise. Since the sensitivity of the 
volume to changes in the level of listing requirements increases, the surplus of the initial 
owner of the firm also increases more in equilibrium. A higher level of listing requirements 
contributes therefore also to an increase in the revenue from listing. 
The exchange benefits from the increase in the total volume because its market share 
also increases when public information becomes more precise. Although both trading fees 
diminish with  , the trading volume becomes more sensitive to the difference in trading fees 
which yields a higher market share to the exchange. 
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Lemma 4 
For  2    , the revenue from volume of the exchange diminishes with the level of listing 
requirements. For  2    , it increases. 
 
The revenue the exchange obtains from trading is affected in opposite ways when   
increases. First, the market share of the exchange becomes larger and this increase is the 
highest when competition on trading fees is low, i.e. when    is small. Second the trading fee 
decreases and this in particular when   is small either. The effect on the revenue from trading 
stemming from the evolution of the trading fee dominates the one related to changes in the 
market share. When competition is strong, the revenue from trading diminishes with the level 
of  listing  requirements  due  to  the  decreasing  trading  fee.  When  competition  is  weak,  the 
revenue from trading increases with the level of listing requirements, due to the larger market 
share and to the negligible change in the trading fee. This contrasts to the monopoly case, in 
which the revenue from trading always increases with the level of listing requirements since 
the exchange captures the entire growth in the trading volume. 
Even  though  the  exchange  might  be  able  to  increase  its  revenue  from  trading  by 
setting a higher signal precision, this increase is always smaller than when the exchange is a 
monopolist.  Thus,  even  with  weak  competition  and  despite  the  positive  effects  that 
competition  has  on  the  overall  trading  volume  and  on  the  exchange’s  market  share,  the 
exchange is not able to improve its revenue from trading to the same extend than when it is a 
monopolist. Weak competition  only limits  the loss  the exchange suffers  compared to  the 
monopoly situation. 
 
Proposition 3 
Assuming that the participation constraint of the owner of the firm is not binding: 
(i)  If  3    ,  the  exchange  sets  a  higher  level  of  listing  requirements  than  in  the 
monopoly case. 
(ii)  If  3    ,  the  exchange  sets  a  smaller  level  of  listing  requirements  than  in  the 
monopoly case. 
The determination of the threshold  3   is explained in the appendix. 
 
If  the  gain  from  fragmentation  is  large,  an  increase  in the  signal  precision  limits 
competition on trading fees. If the exchange raises its level of listing requirements, it benefits 
not only from a higher increase of the revenue from listing compared to the monopoly case. 
The  increase  in  the  revenue  from  trading  is  smaller  than  in  the  monopoly  case,  but  this 
difference is limited by the possibility for the exchange to raise its market share. The large   26 
gain due to the possibility to split orders combined with the low competitive pressure allows 
the exchange to benefit more from an increase in listing requirements than when the exchange 
is a monopolist. As a consequence, the exchange sets a higher level of listing requirements in 
equilibrium. 
If  the  gain  from  fragmentation  is  small,  competition  is  strong  leading  to  a  sharp 
reduction of the trading fee when the signal precision increases. Although the decrease in the 
trading fee associated with a higher signal precision contributes to an even higher increase in 
the  surplus  of  the  owner,  and  thus  in  the  revenue  from  listing,  this  is  not  sufficient  to 
compensate the loss in revenue from trading. In this case, the exchange benefits less from an 
increase in the signal precision than when it were a monopolist and sets therefore a smaller 
level of listing requirements. 
When the exchange faces competition in volume, it might determine either a higher or a 
smaller  level  of  listing  requirements  in  equilibrium,  compared  to  the  case  in  which  the 
exchange  is  a  monopoly  in  trading.  As  a  consequence,  competition  in  volume  does  not 
necessarily lead to a “race to the bottom” in terms of listing requirements. The determinant 
factor for this decision is the gain investors obtain from fragmentation which determines the 
strength  of price competition and thereby the sensitivity of the profit of the exchange to 
changes in listing requirements. 
The fact that the exchange might raise its level of listing standards in the presence of a 
competing trading platform stems from two effects related to multi-market trading. First, it 
lowers the trading costs of investors which translates into a higher value of shares and a 
higher number of shares on the market. Second, competition on trading fees might be limited 
if  the  absorption  capacity  of  the  markets  is  improved  by  the  existence  of  the  alternative 
trading venue.  
 
Welfare effects of fragmentation. The existence of two trading venues procures three 
types of welfare gains to investors. First, they gain from the possibility to fragment their order 
and to thereby reduce their trading costs. In the present setting, the gain from fragmentation 
stems from the risk aversion of the liquidity suppliers and from the assumption that the entry 
of the alternative trading venue is equivalent to the entry of an additional market maker. The 
idea, that multi market trading improves the liquidity of shares is debated in the literature but 
is consistent with recent empirical work by Foucault and Menkveld (2008) and O’Hara and 
Ye (2009) as well as studies on exchange traded funds (Boehmer and Boehmer (2003)). While 
this analysis claims that there is a link between the motivation of multi-market trading and the   27 
trade-offs faced by a profit maximizing stock exchange deciding over listing requirements, it 
does not claim that gains from fragmentation must come from the mechanisms modeled here. 
The results of the present analysis should also hold in a setting in which the additional trading 
venue enhances competition among liquidity suppliers or increases the probability of trading, 
which would be consistent with the theory part of Foucault and Menkveld (2008).  
The second welfare gain for investors is the competition in trading fees induced by the 
fragmentation of orders. The intensity of competition on trading fees is inversely related to 
their gains from fragmentation. Thus, when the gain from fragmentation is small, investors 
benefit from the presence of several trading venues through the small trading fees. If the 
liquidity gain related to fragmentation is large, the average trading fee paid by investors might 
be higher than without multi-market trading, but the net effect of competition is a reduction in 
their trading costs. 
Third, investors might benefit from a higher level of listing requirements if the gain 
from fragmentation is large enough. This lowers even more their trading costs compared to 
the  monopoly  case.  Most  of  the  literature  on  multi  market  trading  and  order-flow 
fragmentation  takes  the  stock  markets  as  given  institutions  and  analyses  the  behavior  of 
investors. The present analysis shows that multi-market trading affects also the decisions of 
trading venues and thereby the trading costs of investors (and the cost of capital of firms). 
The analysis of the consequences of multi-market trading is undertaken in a similar 
spirit as the welfare analysis of insider trading in Leland (1992). Leland shows that insider 
trading  has  two  opposite  effects  on  social  welfare:  it  reduces  the  welfare  of  outside  and 
liquidity investors but increases real investment (or equivalently the number of issued shares). 
In the present paper, the possibility of multi-market trading has positive welfare effects for 
investors as well as for the firm issuing more shares, when the decisions of exchanges are 
given.  This  shows  the  importance  of  considering  the  supply  of  shares  as  an  endogenous 
variable also in the analysis of order-flow fragmentation. However, once the decisions of 
exchanges  are  considered,  multi  market  trading  induces  also  welfare  costs  either  through 
higher compliance costs when the level of listing requirements rises, or through higher trading 
costs related to less liquidity when the level of listing requirements falls. Thus, in contrast to 
Leland, the present analysis demonstrates the importance of considering the exchanges as 
actors themselves. 
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6.  Extensions 
Social optimality. The last section has stated that investors benefit from multi-market 
trading because their trading costs diminish. The exchange, however, is not always in favor of 
competition, in particular when the pressure on trading fees is strong. The firm issuing shares 
also bears the costs related to the listing requirements. Competition is only socially beneficial 
if these social costs are compensated by the social gains. 
 
Proposition 4 
Competition is socially preferable to a monopoly exchange if: 
(i) 
* *
comp monop     
(ii)  4    and 
* *
comp monop     
(iii)  5    , 
* *
comp monop     
 
 
When the level of listing requirements is the same with and without competition, the 
costs related to the listing requirements are the same. The social gains, composed of the net 
surplus of the initial owner of the firm and the revenues of the exchange and the platform, are 
larger due to the smaller trading costs borne by investors. Therefore, competition is always 
socially optimal in this situation. 
If, with competition, the equilibrium level of listing requirements is smaller than in the 
monopoly case, the positive welfare effects of fragmentation are reduced which lowers the 
social  gains  related  to  fragmentation.  If  on  the  same  time,  competition  on  tr ading  fees  is 
strong  enough,  the  smaller  trading  fees  paid  by  investors  in  the  case  of  competition 
compensate  the  losses  due  to  the  lower  level  of  listing  requirements.  In  this  case,  social 
welfare is also improved with competition. The threshold on the strength of competition,  4  , 
depends on the steepness of the cost function. The smaller 
*
monop   is and the flatter the cost 
function is, the lower is also this threshold. 
If  the  level  of  listing  requirements  is  higher  with  competition  than  without,  the 
existence of the alternative platform is only socially beneficial if competition is not too weak. 
However, the threshold in this case is larger than in part (ii) of proposition 4 -  4 5    . It is 
also larger than the threshold at which the exchange begins to regulate listing more strictly 
with competition -  3 5    . A large   allows investors to reduce their price impact, but at the 
same time it leads to average trading fees that are larger than the monopoly fee. This limits 
the gain investors obtain from fragmentation and thereby its positive welfare effects compared   29 
to the monopoly situation. This situation implies also higher compliance costs borne by firms 
which reduces the exchange’s profit and limits the social desirability of competition. 
As a conclusion, regardless of whether competition leads to more or less regulation of 
listings by the exchange, it is only socially desirable when the pressure on trading fees is 
strong enough.  
 
Sub-optimal regulation. More precise public information does not only procure a 
gain to the exchange, it also increases the revenue of the trading platform (as long as   is not 
too large or    very small) and the utility as well as the costs of the initial owner of the firm. 
However, the exchange takes the decision over   considering only its own profit and not the 
gains or losses of the trading platform and of the owner. 
 
Proposition 5 
The level of listing requirements the exchange sets in equilibrium is sub-optimal from a social 
point of view, regardless of whether there is competition in volume or not. 
 
  A social planner would set the level of listing requirements taking into account the 
profit of the trading platform in addition to the surplus of the owner. The socially optimal 
signal precision satisfies the following condition: 
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Listing  requirements  procure  different  gains  and  costs  to  investo rs  and  to  the  
exchange. If the exchange  determines the  listing requirements, it does  in particular  not 
internalize the utility gain and the additional compliance costs borne by the owner of the firm 
associated with higher listing requirements. This induces  the exchange not to set a socially 
optimal level of listing requirements. This problem is analyzed empirically by Macey et al. 
(2005) in the context of delisting  decisions. The authors show that delisting decisions are 
taken in a way that harms investors  but that seems to procure gains to the NYSE. They 
interpret the evidence as indicating that the NYSE does not internalize the loss of utility of 
investors in its delisting decisions. 
In the case of competition, the exchange also fails to internalize the pr ofit of the 
trading platform in its decision on listing requirements.  This enhances the sub-optimality of 
listing requirements when they are determined by the exchange , regardless of whether   30 
competition induces the exchange to raise or to lower listing requirements compared to the 
monopoly case. Thus enhanced under-regulation due to competition in order-flow does not 
necessarily imply a smaller level of listing requirements. 
One possibility to partially solve the problem related to the public good nature of 
listing requirements would consist in merging both trading venues. In this case, the trading 
fees  and  the  listing  requirements  maximise  the  joint  surplus  of  both  organisations.  Since 
investors benefit from fragmentation, the merged exchange has an interest to keep two distinct 
trading platforms. However, the merged exchange does not have to compete for volume, but it 
can  determine  the  trading  fees  on  both  platforms  such  that  the  distribution  of  volume  is 
optimal for the merged exchange.  
 
Proposition 6 
If the trading platform and the exchange are merged to constitute one integrated organisation: 
(i)  The trading fees on both trading venues are identical to the fee set by a monopoly 
exchange.  
(ii)  When  0   , the profit of the merged entity is larger than in the monopoly case. 
(iii)  The level of listing requirements set by the integrated organisation is higher than in the 
monopoly case if and only if  6    . It is smaller if  6    . 
The determination of the threshold  6   is explained in the appendix. 
 
The merged organisation benefits from the gain of fragmentation and from the absence 
of competition. This explains the higher profit of the merged entity compared to the monopoly 
case. To maximise the gain from fragmentation, the merged entity sets the same trading fee on 
both venues, so that the volume is equally distributed. Since the merged entity determines the 
trading fees only relative to their effects on the number of issued shares and on the total 
trading  volume,  it  faces  the  same  trade-off  than  the  monopoly  exchange  (with  only  one 
trading venue). In particular, marginal losses and marginal gains related to an increase in the 
trading fee are scaled by the price impact. Therefore, the price impact does not determine the 
optimal trading fee which is the same as in proposition 1.  
The  gain  that  the  merged  entity  obtains  when  it  increases  the  signal  precision , 
however, might still be lower than when the exchange is a monopolist. Although a smaller 
price impact renders the profit of the exchange more sensitive to changes in the level of listing 
requirements,  the  price  impact  changes  less  in  the  case  of  the  merged  entity   when    
increases. When    is small, the increase in the revenue when public information becomes 
more precise is smaller for the merged entity and the equilibrium level of listing requirements 
is then also smaller. When    becomes large, the revenue of the merged entity increase more   31 
with the signal precision as compared to the monopoly situation. This leads to a higher level 
of listing requirements in equilibrium. 
The merged entity sets the same trading fee than the monopolist exchange with only 
one  trading  venue.  Whether  it  is  socially  desirable  depends  on  two  factors.  First,  if  the 
equilibrium level of listing requirements is smaller than in the monopoly case, it depends on 
whether this offsets the gains of investors related to the possibility to fragment their orders. 
Second, if the equilibrium level of listing requirements is above the one prevailing in the 
monopoly case, it depends on whether the additional costs imposed on the firm are offset by 
the additional gains. 
  The  merged  entity  might  also  be  socially  preferable  to  competition  between  the 
exchange and the platform. The merged entity obtains a higher marginal revenue from listing 
requirements than the exchange when there is competition. Indeed, the merged entity benefits 
from the increase of the total volume and does not lower its trading fee. Despite the possibly 
higher level of trading fees, the merger of the exchange and the platform might improve social 
welfare if it leads to a sufficiently higher equilibrium level of listing requirements without 
increasing the costs too much. 
 
Informed trading. The analysis has, up to this point, assumed that the probability to 
become the liquidity trader is  5 . 0   .  This  has  allowed  abstracting  from  the  part  of  the 
spread that emerges due to possible informed trading on the secondary market. The adverse 
selection costs anticipated in the case of a liquidity shock were offset by the information gain 
anticipated  in  the  case  private  information  is  observed.  When  this  hypothesis  is  relaxed, 
investors discount (increase) the IPO price they are willing to pay for the shares issued by the 
initial owner of the firm by an additional component reflecting the expected loss (or gain) 
related to informed trading: 
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When  5 . 0   , it is more likely to become the liquidity trader and thus, the adverse selection 
cost  gains  in  importance  for  investors.  The  IPO  price  is  discounted  by  the  information 
component of the spread, S. This additional expected trading cost also reduces the number of 
issued shares, the surplus of the initial owner of the firm, the equilibrium trading fee and the 
profit  of  the  exchange  and of the  trading  platform.  If, on  the  contrary, observing  private   32 
information is more likely ( 5 . 0   ), the information component, is an expected gain and 
raises the IPO price. This increases all the aforementioned variables. 
The  probability,   ,  affects  the  objective  function  of  the  exchange  in  opposite  ways 
depending  on  its  value.  It  influences  therefore  also  the  decision  on  the  level  of  listing 
requirements. An increase in the precision of public information lowers S. Thus it affects the 
profit of the exchange not only through the price impact but also through the information 
component  of  the  spread.  If  5 . 0   ,  the  threshold  up  from  which  the  exchange facing 
competition from a platform regulates listing more strictly than in the monopoly case is lower 
than in proposition 3. This is because in addition to reducing the price impact, a higher level 
of listing requirements also reduces the information component of the spread. Since investors 
are more sensitive to changes in trading costs when an alternative trading platform exists, the 
exchange  obtains  an  additional  gain  from  regulation  compared  to  the  monopoly  case.  If 
5 . 0   , the threshold is higher because increasing   lowers the expected information gain of 
investors.  Consequently, the characteristics of the investor base present on an exchange and, 
in particular, its access to private information has an impact on the way in which more public 
information  influences  the  price  of  shares  and  thereby  the  decisions  of  the  firms  and 
eventually those of the exchange. 
 
7.  Conclusion 
The present model aims at analyzing the relationships between listing requirements, 
the organization of trading and the disparities between social and private optima regarding 
listing requirements. It has shown that competition in volume has an impact on the level of 
listing  requirements  set  by  an  exchange  but  this  impact  is  not  necessarily  detrimental  to 
investors, although it might enhance under-regulation with respect to the social optimum. 
Also, competition in volume does not necessarily induce the exchange to lower its level of 
listing requirements despite the regulatory costs borne partially by the exchange and the loss 
of market share in volume. This is in particular the case, when the possibility to fragment 
orders yields important gains to investors. 
The  main  result  of  the  model  is  that  the  effect  of  competition  in  volume  on  the 
regulatory activity of a self-regulating, profit maximizing exchange regarding listings depends 
on the nature of the competition for order-flow. If competition is mainly driven by prices, a 
profit  maximizing  exchange  is  induced  to  lower  its  level  of  listing  requirements.  If   33 
competition is mainly driven by gains related to the fragmentation of orders, the exchange can 
benefit from positive welfare effects and is induced to raise its level of listing requirements 
This model yields important policy implications. It shows that the question whether an 
exchange should be self-regulating with respect to listings in general is highly complex and 
debatable. Listing requirements are a public good. If an exchange privately determines listing 
requirements,  it  does  not  internalize  the  utility  of  investors  (which  is  the  case  with  and 
without competition in volume) nor does it internalize the gains of additional trading venues.  
In the case where several trading venues exist, a merger of the trading venues with the 
exchange might reduce the inefficiency of listing requirements since the merged organization 
maximizes the joint surplus. However, the merged organization only benefits from listing 
requirements  if  the  gain  which  investors  obtain  from  the  fragmentation  of  orders  is 
sufficiently large. Thus, it is again the nature of fragmentation that determines whether the 
merger of trading venues leads to less regulation or not.  
This analysis shows that there is an interdependence between the listing fee and the 
trading fees when the listing fee is proportional to the surplus of the owner of the firm. The 
association of these two activities in one single profit maximizing entity contributes to the 
reduction of the overall level of trading fees. Thus, combining the functions of listing and 
trading in one entity improves the welfare of investors. This point holds as long as the revenue 
from listing depends on transaction costs on the exchange as well as on competing trading 
venues.  
In the current policy debate around how listing and trading should be organized, given 
that there are trading platforms that compete with exchanges for order-flow in shares of the 
firms listed on the exchange, it is generally stipulated, that since listing regulation is a public 
good, it is under-provided by a profit maximizing exchange in the presence of order-flow 
fragmentation. Listing should therefore be separated from the trading activity. The present 
paper  complements  this  debate  by  two  elements.  First,  it  has  demonstrated  that  under-
provision of regulation exists even without competition in volume . Second, it has shown that 
this debate should take into account the impacts of possible welfare effects on the decision of 
the exchange: There can be positive welfare effects in the case of competition in volume, but 
there can also be negative welfare effects when listing is separated from trading.  
The present analysis could be extended in several ways to better understand the causes 
and consequences of the transformations occurring in the stock market industry. The listing 
decision of firms and the entry decision of investors could be determined endogenously. In 
particular,  if  competition  in  volume  leads  to  lower  trading  fees,  it  could  attract  a  higher   34 
number of firms and of investors into the market. This could lead to a higher liquidity on all 
trading venues as well as to better risk sharing opportunities for investors and consequently to 
a lower cost of capital for firms (Pagano 1989a, 1989b, 1993).  These effects could enforce 
the positive impact of competition on the welfare of investors and could eventually lead to a 
higher level of listing requirements if it is determined by the exchange.  
On  the  empirical  side,  only  a  few  papers  compare  institutional  characteristics  across 
exchanges in the world. Frost et al. (2006) find evidence for a positive link between the 
strictness of disclosure standards as well as the quality of enforcement and the liquidity on 
exchanges.  Clayton et al. (2006) establish a link between the choice of trading mechanisms 
and institutional characteristics of the home countries of exchanges such as the legal system.  
The theory developed in this paper calls for an extensions of this literature, and in particular 
for an analysis of competition in volume in relation with the price structure as well as the 
regulatory competency of stock markets.  
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Appendix 
 
Appendix A1 
In  the  case  of  a  good  signal  ( h x s  ),  the  bid  price  the  liquidity  trader  expects  is: 
l B x P ) 1 (     , where  B P  is determined in equation 7. In the case of a bad signal ( l x s  ), the 
bid price the liquidity trader expects is:  l B x P     ) 1 ( . Since, before  4  t , the signals are 
expected to occur with probability ½ , the equally weighted average of the expected bid prices 
conditional on public information yields equation 8. 
 
 
Proposition 1 
 
The profit function of the exchange is concave in the trading fee. When the expression for 
* *   
is replaced in the objective function (equation 18), it follows that  0
,
2
,
2


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m e
m e
f
. The optimal 
trading  fee  when  the  exchange  derives  revenue  from  the  listing  activity  is:       
 

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If the exchange derives revenue only from the trading activity, the trading maximising this 
revenue is: 
2 2 V K . Since 




2
1 is positive, the optimal trading fee is always smaller when 
the exchange has income from listing. 
 
 
Proposition 2 
 
(i)  The maximisation of equations 21 and 22 yields optimal trading fees: 
e V e A RP K f   
2 * 2   and  pl V pl A RP K f   
2 * 2   with   pl e A A  . Therefore  
* *
pl e f f  . 
The second derivatives of both profit functions are negative,  0 2
2


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e
e
f
 and  0 2
2


 
pl
pl
f
,  and 
the calculated optima are maxima. 
 
(ii)  It follows from (i) that  0
* *   pl e f f  if  0    since in this case,  0  RP . 
 
(iii)  The weighted average trading fee in the case of competition is larger than the 
equilibrium trading in the monopoly case when the risk aversion of the market makers 
is large enough:    0  
*
,
* * * *) 1 ( m e pl e f f f       . Otherwise, the average fee is 
smaller:    0  
*
,
* * * *) 1 ( m e pl e f f f      . The threshold  0   is such that 
*
,
* * * *) 1 ( m e pl e f f f      . 
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Lemma 1 
Assume a level of listing requirements,   
 
(i)  The volume in the monopoly and in the competition situations are determined by the 
fraction sold by the owner. In the case the exchange is a monopolist in trading, this 
fraction is smaller than when there is competition: 
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(ii)  The surplus of the owner is larger with competition:  
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(iii)  The exchange’s profit is smaller than in the monopoly case if and only if the risk 
aversion of market makers is small enough: 
  1    
) , (
2 4
2 * *
2
2 2
f
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K
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. Otherwise,  the profit is larger with 
competition. The threshold  1   is such that   
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Lemma 2 
In the parameter regions as they are specified in the model, the equilibrium trading fees 
always decrease with the level of listing requirements:  0
*




e f
 and  0
*


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
pl f
. Furthermore: 
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Lemma 3 
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Lemma 4 
The revenue the exchange obtains from volume when it faces competition is: 
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Proposition 3 
There is a threshold,  3   at which 
  
 


  ) ( ) , (
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,
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If 3    , 
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 


  ) ( ) , ( * * * f f f pl e e . 
*
e  is always larger than the signal precision maximising 
the profit in the monopoly case.  
If 3    , 
  
 


  ) ( ) , ( * * * f f f pl e e . 
*
e  is always smaller than the signal precision maximising 
the profit in the monopoly case. 
 
 
Proposition 4 
(i)  For a given value , the cost generated by this level of listing requirements is the same 
in any cases. The sum of social gains is larger in the case of competition than in the 
monopoly  situation:  ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) (
*
, ,
* * * * *
m e m e pl pl e e f Rvol U f f Rvol U        .  It 
follows  that  competition  is  socially  preferable  to  the  monopoly  situation  when  the 
level of listing requirements remains identical. 
(ii)  When 
* *
comp monop    ,  competition  improves  social  welfare  if  and  only  if: 
) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) (
* *
, ,
* * * * * *
monop m e m e comp pl pl e e C f Rvol U C f f Rvol U            which 
holds only for  4    . 
(iii)  When 
* *
comp monop    ,  competition  improves  social  welfare  if  and  only  if: 
) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) (
* *
, ,
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holds only for  5    . 
 
 
Proposition 5 
 
Case1: the exchange is a monopolist: 
 
The socially optimal level of listing requirements is determined by the following equation: 
0
, 

 


 
 
U m e . Since 
 
  m e,  contains only a fraction of the compliance costs and the 
surplus of the owner is not internalized, the exchange sets a non -optimal level of listing 
requirements from a social point of view. 
 
Case2: competition in volume 
The socially optimal precision is determined by equation 23. The social optimum increases 
compared to the monopoly case by the extra term
 
  pl . The difference between the socially   42 
optimal  signal  precision  and 
*
e    is  determined  by 
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  U pl . If  0 
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U pl , the 
social optimum is below the optimum of the exchange and the exchange over-regulates from a 
social point of view. If  0 

 


 
 
U pl , the social optimum is above the optimum of the 
exchange and the exchange under-regulates from a social point of view. 
 
 
Proposition 6 
 
(i)  The merged exchange determines simultaneously the trading fees of both platforms by 
maximising the joint profit:  pl e f f pl e
Max   
, . The second derivatives of the joint profit 
with respect to either trading fees are negative. Thus the profit is concave in trading 
fees and the optimal trading fees are: 
*
,
* *
m e pl e f f f   .  
(ii)  For  0   , the trading volume and the revenue from listing of the merged entity is 
identical to the one in the monopoly  case  with only  one trading venue. Since the 
trading fee is the same as in the monopoly case, the profit of the merged entity is 
identical  to  the  one  in  the  monopoly  case.  If  0   ,  the  trading  volume  and  the 
revenue from listing are higher due to the gain from fragmentation. It follows that the 
profit of the merged entity is also higher than in the monopoly case. 
(iii)  Denote the profit of the merged exchange by  pl e m      . There is a threshold,  6  , 
at which 
  
 


 
*
,
*
m e m , with
*
,m e  the profit of the exchange when it is a monopoly. 
For  6    , 
  
 

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 
*
,
*
m e m  and the signal precision set by the merged exchange is 
higher than in the monopoly case. For  6    , 
  
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

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*
,
*
m e m and the signal precision 
set by the merged exchange is smaller than in the benchmark case.  
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